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Abstract 
 
The African continent is a region of increasing economic opportunity and threats of terrorism. 
What accounts for these seemingly contradictory trends? This study argues that the recent 
terrorism rise is partly due to increasing investment by multinational corporations (MNCs) in 
Africa. I examine MNC investment in infrastructure through the mechanism of Private 
Participation in Infrastructure (PPI). I argue that greater infrastructure investment gives African 
states the incentive and military capacity to reassert control over territories previously lost to 
violent non-state actors. MNCs introduce a third party into the bargaining between militants and 
governments over resource control. Since MNC investment empowers the state, the resulting 
territorial contestation may induce non-state actors to respond with terrorism. I argue that 
African states will experience increasing terrorist attacks as PPI increases and furthers the 
process of state consolidation. Increasing PPI gives terrorist campaigns an initial burst of resolve 
to prolong their initiatives. However, I ultimately assert that if this PPI investment is allowed to 
appreciate through initial periods of increased violence, African states can eventually use this 
new power to accelerate the demise of terrorist groups. Sustained MNC investment will 
strengthen African governments and decrease the survivability of terrorist campaigns. I test these 
predictions on terrorist attacks and campaigns in the post Cold War period from 1990-2006. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The modern African continent is a region abounding with contradictions of economic 
development and state stability. In May 2000, the cover of The Economist featured a gun-
wielding African militant and the title, “The Hopeless Continent.” In December 2011, however, 
the cover of The Economist once again featured Africa, but this time with an image of a rainbow 
kite and the title “Africa Rising.” This attitudinal shift speaks to the emergence of seemingly 
paradoxical developments on the African continent. Many countries on the continent are seeing 
tremendous interest for economic investment, while simultaneously undergoing a surge in high 
profile terrorist activity. In 2011, for example, Nigeria saw its GDP surpass that of Egypt and 
South Africa. Yet, in 2011 the country also experienced an intense surge in the Boko Haram 
terrorism campaign, which peaked with the Chibok schoolgirl kidnappings. As recently as 2013, 
The Economist published articles warning about the dangers of Jihadist terrorism in Africa 
(“Jihad in Africa” 2013) and the Obama administration declared Africa a potential center for the 
“War on Terror.” However, media also simultaneously exalted Africa as the “hottest frontier” for 
business (“Investing in Africa” 2013), while the Obama administration launched its “Doing 
Business in Africa Campaign” and pledged $14 billion of American private sector investment in 
Africa (White House Office of the Press Secretary 2014). How can we reconcile these seemingly 
contradictory narratives?  
To unpack this paradox between investment and terrorism, I want to examine how the 
investment of multinational corporations (MNCs) in the African continent is altering the 
dynamic between governments and militant groups that threaten state stability. Ultimately, my 
research argues that a key reason for the increase in terrorism in Africa is the recent surge in 
MNC investment and the resulting strengthening and consolidation of African states. 
Specifically, throughout my research I look at the partnering of MNCs with state governments in 
the investment, management, and ownership of projects in the infrastructure sector. Known as 
“Private Participation in Infrastructure” (PPI Investment), this practice intends to facilitate cost 
and profit sharing in the build and maintenance of projects in key sectors for economic growth 
and development: water, energy, transport, and telecom (World Development Report 1994: 
Infrastructure for Development 1994). I argue that this PPI Investment is leading African states 
to reassert control over territories and resources previously controlled by militants. As these 
territories become contested and militant groups feel threatened, I expect to see higher levels of 
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terrorism. Therefore, I hypothesize that increased MNC investment will breed increased 
terrorism in Africa in the short term. However, since the increased investment allows African 
states to consolidate and strengthen, I ultimately anticipate that the cumulative effect of 
investment will increase state capacity to accelerate the demise of sub-state terrorism campaigns.  
Thus, my research attempts to offer an explanation that explores the relationship between 
microeconomic decisions of individual firms, state expansion into territory, and state 
consolidation of power in the face of sub-state challengers. First, my study develops a theory 
about the relationship between terrorism and territorial contestation. Ultimately, I explain how 
infrastructure investment can lead MNCs to become influential players in the bargaining between 
terrorist groups and the state. Then, I statistically examine the influence of MNC investment on 
the number of terrorist attacks and the duration of terrorist campaigns on the African continent. 
Finally, I qualitatively examine the data findings within a case study of energy infrastructure 
investment and terrorism in the Niger Delta. Throughout my paper, I aim to develop and test a 
theory that explains how the investment decisions of MNCs in African infrastructure impact 
terrorism levels and the survivability of terrorist groups in African states. After decades of slow 
growth on the African continent, these findings and their policy implications are particularly 
crucial during a time when economists and investors see huge potential in the “rise” of Africa. In 
this moment of optimism and opportunity, the aggregate destabilization of numerous African 
countries due to terrorism could foster increased violence and economic stagnation.  
BACKGROUND 
Economic Restructuring on the African Continent  
I first turn to a brief historical analysis of the economic developments on the continent 
from the 20th to the 21st centuries. In the post-colonial era, many African states were left with 
power vacuums in their political institutions and unstable economic structures (Illife 2007). As 
dictators rose to power in numerous African states, these states relied on exporting primary 
commodities to finance their expenditures (Clapham 1996). During the oil shocks and downturn 
of commodity prices in the 1970s, these states borrowed large sums of money to finance their 
governments. With dwindling economic support for development and military capacity at the 
end of the Cold War, many African states could not make their payments and suffered mounting 
debts. This situation weakened African states and largely contributed to the internal unrest that 
culminated in the civil wars that swept the continent at this time. During these civil wars, rebel 
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groups and militants took control of territories beyond the reach of African governments (Rabasa 
et al., 2007). With minimal state strength, governments found it difficult to reclaim control over 
these anarchic and “ungoverned” territories, even after the civil wars ended (Rabasa et al., 2007). 
Over time, however, militants controlling these territories set up governing and policing systems 
(Rabasa et al., 2007). Key examples include the frontier-like Kenyan border with Somalia, or 
Tanzania’s Zanzibar island that basically conducted its own internal affairs under Sharia law. 
Moreover, sub-state groups in these areas could take advantage of the resource-wealth in their 
territories, giving incentive and ability to sustaining militant control and keeping the national 
government out (Fearon 2003).  
Simultaneously, near the end of the Cold War there was also an increase in foreign 
investment. With the weakening USSR, mounting African debt crisis, need for economic 
restructuring, and accumulation of conditional loans, MNCs saw an opportunity to invest in and 
appreciate African resources at relatively low up-front costs. Specifically, MNCs looked to 
invest in African markets and minerals. Finding largely weak and fragmented African 
governments to support them, however, MNCs and their governments sought to increase African 
state capacity. This would yield a better return on investment and less investment risk. Similarly, 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a major push among international finance 
institutions (i.e. IMF and World Bank) to enact economic reforms on the African continent. 
Anticipated benefits of such economic restructuring programs were increases in GDP, decreases 
in unemployment, transfer of new technology, formation of capital markets, etc. (World 
Development Report 1994, 11). All of these improvements were seen as signs of “successful 
states,” beneficial to the global economy and global security at large.    
Furthermore, during the 1990s, a pillar of structural reform in Africa was industry 
privatization (Narsiah 2002, 3). Privatization was specifically expected to foster international 
economic ties that could expand to free trade agreements (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010, 
31). Full privatization, however, was often controversial to African governments, which were 
reluctant to give up state ownership of national enterprises (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 
2010). For this reason, privatization often occurred through the mechanism of “private 
participation,” which relied on a mixed approach of private investment and public-private 
partnerships. African states lost their central monopolies on resources, but gained the ability to 
strengthen and consolidate with the added backing of these private sponsors.  
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Moreover, much of these privatization partnerships were directed at the infrastructure 
sector (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010).1 With an emphasis on energy, transport, 
communication, and water, infrastructure development was crucial for economic development 
and state capacity building. According to a 1994 World Bank report on infrastructure 
development, the success and failure of a country is determined by the “adequacy” of its 
infrastructure (World Bank 1994). Furthermore, the report cites the benefits of increased 
competition, maintenance, and expertise that result from opening infrastructure to the private 
sector (World Bank 1994, 10). The general argument was that infrastructure development must 
be driven by private participation. According to the 2005 Commission for Africa, private 
participation in African infrastructure was also introduced in order to integrate African 
economies into the global economy, “offset geographical dislocation,” and strengthen African 
states in the face of “sovereign fragmentation” (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010, 31). 
Unsurprisingly, the private sector remains the largest source of all official development 
assistance for African infrastructure to date (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010, 9). 
Into the post-9/11 era, investment through private participation in infrastructure (PPI) 
continued to be a primary method of promoting economic and political stability in African states. 
Infrastructure has fueled more than half of the recent improvement in growth on the African 
continent (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010, 1). Without the private sector, African states 
would have to spend 25% of their GDPs to eliminate the “infrastructure gap” (Foster and 
Briceño-Garmendia 2010, 11). PPI investment efforts have been generally successful in Africa, 
as the African continent averaged a 4.9% annual growth rate from 2000 to 2008 (Leke et al., 
2010).  
In terms of state consolidation overall, PPI allowed African governments to strengthen 
while shouldering less of the economic growth burden (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010, 
14). Since 1990, the trend of increased MNC investment increased profits for state governments, 
which allowed for increased urbanization, job creation, and eventually an enlarged tax base 
(Slantchev 2012). Thus, the MNC investment increased state power by allowing African 
governments to finance public projects, enhance spending on security, and in some cases pay off 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The sector includes energy infrastructure (generation and distribution of oil, natural gas, and electricity), 
telecommunication infrastructure (fixed or mobile telephony), transport infrastructure (airport runways and 
terminals, railways, toll roads, bridges, highways, ports, and channels), and water infrastructure (potable water 
generation and distribution, sewage collection and treatment) (“Private Participation in Infrastructure Database” 
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allies and foes for their support. This growth in state stability created a positive feedback loop 
that in turn fueled greater MNC investment. Nevertheless, many of the most lucrative areas for 
MNC infrastructure investment remained in militant-controlled, “ungoverned” territories. 
Increased PPI investment therefore created a situation in which MNCs had incentives to 
penetrate into ungoverned territories and African states (as their partners) had incentives to 
infiltrate and reclaim these territories from militant group control.  
Insurgency and Terrorism in Africa since 1990  
MNC infrastructure investment in Africa attempted to mitigate economic inefficiency, 
while enhancing state stability in the wake of the Cold War’s end and the onset of civil wars 
across the continent  (Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 2010, 16). Today, discourse on the security 
of Africa is still present, but this time in the language of the “War on Terror” (Abrahamsen 2004, 
678). Contemporary accounts of terrorism on the continent increased since the early 2000s (U.S. 
Department of State 2013), and the Obama administration made the securitization of Africa a 
component of its national security and counterterrorism policy (U.S. Department of State 2013). 
As former President George W. Bush asserted in 2002, “failed states can become havens for 
terror” (Kahn and Weiner 2002). In the post-9/11 era and throughout the “War on Terror,” the 
dominant thinking relayed by the U.S. government is that investment in Africa will lead to 
military and economic capacity building, which will thwart state failure and promote security 
(Rabasa et al. 2007, 8). Unsurprisingly, these assertions are in line with the notion that economic 
development allows African governments to expand and consolidate control over territories with 
militant groups (Rabasa et al. 2007).  
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Figure 1. Terrorist Events in Africa 1970 - 2011 
 
Surprisingly, multiple data sources indicate that Africa has experienced relatively low 
terrorism in comparison to other regions. For example, the RAND Database of Worldwide 
Terrorism Incidents (RWTI) demonstrates that Africa comprises of only 5% of global terrorist 
attacks between 1969 and 2009 (Jones and Libicki 2008).2 Nevertheless, internally the terrorist 
attack frequency on the continent is rising (See Figure 1). Anecdotally, a few of the post-9/11 
accounts of terrorism on the continent are the 2002 bombings in Mombasa, Kenya, the 2008 Al-
Shabaab bombings at a sporting event in Kampala, Uganda, the attacks on tourists and the US 
embassy bombing in Yemen from 2007 to 2009, and the Nigerian college campus bombings by 
Boko Haram in 2013 (U.S. Department of State 2013).  
Contextualizing the history of African economic reform within African geopolitics sheds 
light on the mixed narratives of economic hope and political despair that currently circulate 
across the continent. What is causing these patterns in African terrorism? Are African states 
prepared to counter these internal threats? In this backdrop of economic and geopolitical history, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. 2013. Available at: 
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php 
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it is pertinent and interesting to examine the connections between private investment, 
infrastructure, and terrorism on the African continent. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most studies on economic factors and terrorism occur on the macro scale (i.e. examining 
foreign direct investment) and largely focus on the effect that terrorism has on incoming 
investments. My study not only aims to understand whether investment can instead affect 
terrorism, but also approaches the issue from a microeconomic perspective. By examining 
investment decisions of individual MNCs between 1990 and 2006, I aim to better understand the 
relationship between investment and terrorism in Africa. To outline my contribution to the field, 
I would like to briefly survey the previous academic literature linking economic indicators and 
terrorism.  
A foundational work for this area of research is Fearon and Laitin’s 2003 study about 
GDP per capita and civil war. While not specifically about terrorism, the study found a positive 
relationship between low levels of GDP per capita (often indicative of low growth and standard 
of living) and high levels of civil war, paving the way for identifying a relationship between a 
state’s economy and its susceptibility to destabilization by sub-state violence. Building on this 
literature and narrowing it to the African continent, Miguel et al. (2004) found a positive 
connection between exogenous shocks that negatively affect a state’s economic growth and the 
likelihood for civil conflict in a sample. My research draws upon this cross-country approach, as 
well as this notion that a factor external to the state can affect the relationship between a state’s 
economy and its level of violence.  
Beyond political violence that ends in civil conflict, I also draw on more recent literature 
that analyzes relationships between economic indicators and terrorism. This body of work 
mainly discusses terrorism in the context of poverty levels indicated by macroeconomic 
measures. Variables like GDP, GDP per capita, unemployment, and income inequality are most 
often analyzed, though the findings vary. Studies that find a link between poverty and terrorism 
usually analyze economic indicators related to foreign aid. Most notably, Azam and Thelen 
(2008) suggest that higher levels of aid can boost economic productivity and reduce the onset of 
terrorism. However, many studies on poverty and terrorism find no relationship between the two 
factors. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) suggest that there is little causal connection between 
poverty, education, and terrorism, and in fact find a weak positive relationship between 
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education/wealth and the propensity to join a terrorist organization on an individual level. Piazza 
(2006) similarly finds little significance of inequality, unemployment, and poor economic growth 
as predictors of terrorism. These studies generally conclude that terrorism is caused by political 
and social cleavages, rather than economic factors. The conflicting results surrounding the link 
between poverty and terrorism mean that other economic indicators beyond measures of wealth 
must be explored more deeply, not that economics should be left out of terrorism analysis. As 
stated above, a model that is more focused on microeconomic indicators may reveal more about 
the decision of a group to use terrorism over other strategies. For this reason, my research aims 
to analyze economic indicators beyond aggregate measures of wealth and to focus on terrorism 
as a group strategy, rather than terrorism in terms of recruitment, population control, or 
individual choice.  
Moreover, to inform my research I also examine studies that analyze relationships 
between economic integration/globalization and terrorism. Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006) show 
that terrorism levels are significantly reduced in developing countries with higher levels of trade 
openness (ratio of exports and imports to GDP), as international trade raises the difficulty of 
militant groups to secure funds and finance terrorism. The study, however, analyzes these 
relationships at a specific point in time. Therefore, I draw on the pooled time series method used 
by Li and Schaub (2004) in their examination of the relationship between terrorism and trade, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and portfolio investment. Li and Schaub (2004) find that 
indicators of economic integration have “no direct positive effect on transnational terrorist 
incidents within countries,” and that FDI and trade reduce terrorism to the extent that they 
promote economic development (232). Yet, the African continent has seen increased terrorism 
during a period of continuously increasing economic integration. Perhaps the Li and Schaub 
(2004) study fails to capture part of the development story by overlooking economic decisions 
below the macro level.  
After examining this body of work, it appears that the literature is limited in a few key 
ways. Previous studies tend to analyze economic indicators and terrorism without 
contextualizing these economic trends in the strategic behavior of a terrorist group. While 
previous studies opened the door to cross-sectional analyses of economics and terrorism, by 
remaining on the macroeconomic level they over-aggregate a type of violence often rooted in 
local pressures. Moreover, the link between economic indicators and the lifespan of terrorist 
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groups is largely missing. By looking at the investment behavior of MNCs, specifically in the 
infrastructure sector, I aim to develop a theory that links microeconomic indicators and struggles 
over territory and resource control. I want to offer a nuanced explanation of the propensity to use 
terrorism and the survivability of a terrorist group over time. As a spatial analysis, my research 
contextualizes the relationship between terrorist groups and the state in a geopolitical setting of 
territorial contestation. The microeconomic component examines how the behaviors of 
multinational firms engaging in private investment add a third party to the dynamic between 
governments and terrorist groups, influencing the behavior of these groups. As a temporal 
analysis, I aim to account for the dynamic nature of power and control. Overall, I hope to capture 
the interaction among decisions of MNCs to invest, decisions of sub-state groups to employ 
terrorism, and the consolidation and success of a government over a terrorist campaign.  
THEORY 
 The following section will explain two main assertions. First, I investigate how MNC 
investment, specifically through private participation in infrastructure (PPI), can cause territorial 
contestation and ultimately result in terrorism by sub-state challengers. Second, I explore how 
this investment appears to initially increase the lifespan of terrorist campaigns, but the 
accumulation of this investment over time can ultimately enhance the ability of the state to 
succeed in facilitating the cessation of terrorist campaigns. Consequently, the theory will explain 
that PPI investment can lead to increased terrorism levels in the short run, but if given a chance 
to accumulate can decrease the survivability of groups threatening the state.  
To better understand the modern threat of terrorism in African states, I examine the use of 
indiscriminate violence during civil conflict, and the relation that this tactic has to territorial 
power struggles. In studying when militant groups indiscriminately target civilians during a civil 
war, Weinstein (2007) explains the use of indiscriminate violence in terms of geographic 
contestation, implying a struggle for a monopoly of resources and power between militant groups 
and the state. Throughout a civil conflict, militants eliminate state presence in certain regions of 
the country and consolidate control through violence (Kalyvas 2006, 148). However, after a 
group has secured control over a territory, there is evidence of relative peace and stability within 
that territory (Weinstein 2007, 209). This is an example of “segmented sovereignty” within a 
state, as the government has consolidated control over some regions, and militants have 
consolidated control over other regions (Kalyvas 2006, 88). In territories with consolidated 
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militant control and minimal state penetration, the militants behave much in the way the state 
would: “they collect taxes, organize policing, administer justice, and conscript fighters” (Kalyvas 
2006, 218). Due to the state’s lack of influence in these regions, militant groups determine rules 
of daily life, “individuals may look to warlords, mullahs, or tribal leaders rather than state 
entities for judicial processes,” and militants “may offer the only health care or other social 
services available to individuals” (Rabasa et al. 2007, 7). Territorial control is crucial because it 
creates power through monopolies on violence and resources (Kalyvas 2006, 218). The state 
cannot accrue sufficient GDP revenues from these territories, nor can it provide physical 
infrastructure, social infrastructure, and security to the people residing there (Rabasa et al. 2007, 
152). As mentioned in the background section, many of these areas still exist in African states 
today. 
Analysts consider these militant-controlled regions as the breeding grounds for the recent 
rise in terrorism on the African continent (Rabasa et al. 2007, 8). I use this framework of 
territorial contestation during civil wars to understand why ungoverned territories would 
suddenly experience a rise in terrorist activity. Since ungoverned regions are usually remote and 
underdeveloped, governments have little incentive to “develop the infrastructure necessary to 
maintain a robust state presence” in these territories (Rabasa et al. 2007, 8). Lack in physical 
infrastructure is specifically crucial to the concept of ungoverned territories because it sustains 
the severed links between militant regions and the “political and economic heart of the state” 
(Rabasa et al. 2007, 8). Since areas of secure militant control correlate with relative peace and 
areas of territorial contestation correlate with high levels of indiscriminate violence, the increase 
of terrorism from these regions indicates that militant groups perceive a new threat to their 
monopoly on power (Kalyvas 2004).  
I propose that the threat to militant power in ungoverned territories can be traced back to 
MNC investment through the private participation in infrastructure, as well as the resulting effect 
PPI has on state expansion and consolidation. As PPI increased since 1990, MNCs began setting 
up massive infrastructure projects in previously disconnected regions. Since projects manifested 
in the form of public-private partnerships, MNC infiltration into ungoverned territories meant an 
unprecedented expansion in government penetration within these territories. With the incentive 
of profit and cost sharing through PPI, many African governments felt emboldened to reassert 
control over land and resources that they previously left alone. In this way, PPI brought in an 
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additional party (MNCs) to the bargaining between governments and militant groups on the 
topics of territorial control and overall power monopolization. Militant groups were not only 
angered that their de facto sovereignty over a region was dwindling, but also felt like the regions’ 
resources were being redistributed to foreign beneficiaries and national governments.   
MNC investment through private participation in infrastructure consequently involved MNC-
government partnerships that expanded the power of the state and threatened militant groups’ 
ability to survive as ruling entities.  
Finally, what is the logic of terrorism in the context of MNC investment and territorial 
contestation? In other words, why would militant groups use terrorism as a strategy to regain 
territorial control? Just as the areas with the most violence during a civil conflict are the 
territories of “contested control” (Kalyvas 2006, 88), PPI in a territory with militant group 
control can create a contested area that breeds high levels of terrorism. Indiscriminate violence is 
often used as a “strategy of manipulating expectations to shape collaboration and thus shift 
control in contested areas” (Kalyvas 2006, 231). This is known as shifting the “balance of fear” 
(Elliott 2003 as cited in Kalyvas 2006, 231). Thus, the decision to use terrorism attests to the 
external and physical nature of the threat posed by PPI investment, and the resulting desire of 
militant groups to facilitate a change in the behavior of investing MNCs. As militant group 
power is jeopardized by PPI-facilitated state consolidation, the group uses terrorism to create an 
intolerable climate for MNC investment. Ultimately, the groups use terrorism to communicate 
that the ungoverned territories in question are not worthwhile investments and that the central 
government in question is not a powerful partner capable of protecting projects and investments. 
In the face of increased PPI, I theorize that terrorism is heightened to increase the political risk of 
public-private partnerships and to scare private investment out of ungoverned territories.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between PPI investment and the number of 
terrorist attacks in an African state.  
However, a terrorism campaign requires a certain level of resources and organization, so 
terrorist groups are not expected to launch a campaign and then immediately disappear. For this 
reason, in the short term I expect that as PPI investment increases, the probability of government 
success over a militant group will decrease. Initial dollar investment usually manifests in a 
visible presence within a territory, typically in the form of new projects (i.e. an oil rig or plant) 
and new infrastructure to carry out these projects (i.e. roads, pipelines etc.). From the perspective 
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of the terrorist campaign, a group might be initially bolstered in its resolve to destroy these clear 
and visible signs of MNC investment and territorial infringement. For instance, initial terrorist 
attacks following PPI often focus on clear signs of investment within the territory, such as 
bombing oil pipelines or kidnapping workers of new infrastructure projects. There is typically no 
initial motivation for the group to disband, nor settle with the government. From the perspective 
of the state, there is no need to invoke a settlement with a terrorist group in its outset, nor will to 
forcefully crush the terrorist campaign at this level. This is because the terrorist attacks are often 
isolated to a specific territory and therefore not brazen enough to warrant a crushing response or 
persuade the government towards brokering a deal with the terrorist campaign. In any case, the 
mere existence of MNC investment does not necessarily mean that the government is strong 
enough to crush a campaign or to immediately pay off the group in a bargain.  
 Nevertheless, over time the increasing MNC investment also increases state resources, 
which can be converted into an increased capacity to subvert terrorist campaigns. Also, with 
sustained PPI investment in the long run, it is reasonable to conclude that terrorist groups will 
lose so much territory and influence that they will no longer be able to operate as a substantial 
threat to the state. The state in turn may gain enough economic backing to adequately diminish 
threats to its power. Thus, when I examine long-term cumulative PPI investment in African 
states, I expect to see the cumulative effect of the investment pressure on terrorist groups. As 
investment accumulates in the region, it entrenches itself beyond merely visible project 
developments. The cumulative effects of the PPI investments year after year are manifest in the 
transfer of land and resources in the ungoverned territory from the terrorist group to the MNCs 
and eventually to the government. The cumulative effect is also manifest in bolstered state 
strength, fostered by support from the third party MNC actor. This support is visible through 
increased financial resources for the government due to profit splitting in a public-private 
partnership agreement, as sub-state groups observe lucrative resources being funneled out of 
their region. It can also be observed through heightened state legislative and judicial presence in 
the region, usually through law enforcement, census taking, etc.  
From the perspective of terrorist groups, this compounding effect of PPI investment 
means that useful targets of attack become amorphous and the tangible gains from attacks 
become less clear as well. Attacks often shift from targeted instances on physical signs of 
investment to more general attacks against the state in the capital. Decreased group resolve and 
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ability to target and sustain a campaign (i.e. due to dwindling resources and vague attack targets) 
either facilitates collapse or makes a government settlement look increasingly appealing. 
Ultimately, while I expect PPI investment to initially increase the probability of group survival, I 
expect the cumulative effect of PPI investment over time to bolster the state and increase the 
probability of government success over a terrorist organization in the long term.   
Hypothesis 2:  Initial increases in PPI investment increase the potential for terrorist campaign 
survival, but over time the cumulative effect of these investments accelerates the termination of 
campaigns. 
ANALYSIS 
In this section I will design an empirical analysis that tests the potential for a significant 
effect of MNC investment on terrorism in the African continent. For Hypothesis 1 the unit of 
analysis is the country year, and the sample covers 53 countries from 1990-2006. In total, the 
data include 901 country years consisting of 53 African states. For Hypothesis 2 the sample will 
focus on terrorist groups active in African states between 1990 and 2006. The unit of analysis is 
the campaign year because I am measuring terrorist group survivability, or the hazard rate of 
“government success” over a terrorist group. A terrorist group is defined as “a collection of 
individuals belonging to a non-state entity that uses terrorism to achieve its objectives” (Jones 
and Libicki 2008). The sample covers 196 campaign years, encompassing 26 campaigns of 
terrorism against 11 states. In an effort to conduct cross-national comparisons among African 
countries over time, I employ a pooled time series, cross sectional analysis.  
Explanatory Variables 
 The key explanatory variable is the total investment in infrastructure projects with private 
participation per African country year or per campaign year. For Hypothesis 1, I define PPI as 
the US Dollar amount (in millions) of “PPI Investment” per country year.3 For Hypothesis 2, I 
test PPI both as “PPI Investment” as defined above and as “Cumulative PPI Investment,” or the 
cumulative amount of PPI investment with each added year per country in USD millions. Since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I express PPI investment as a dollar amount rather than a count of the number of PPI firms investing per country 
year. PPI dollar amount is a better measure of the force of PPI investment felt within a country in a given year. For 
instance, a country might have only one firm investing in a given year but that firm has poured in large sums of 
money, a better indicator and measure of the investment impact. I also ran the data with the PPI count for robustness 
and found parallel results.  
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Hypothesis 2 focuses on a hazard rate over time, I test both the level of PPI Investment each year 
and the accumulated PPI Investment over time.4  
I obtained these data from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Database generated 
by the World Bank Group (World Bank 2013b). There are several reasons that I chose private 
participation in infrastructure as the measure of multinational corporation investment in Africa. 
First of all, PPI does not measure the level of private sector investment alone, but rather the total 
investment for projects with private sponsorship. A private sponsor is a company that is 
controlled or majority owned by a private party, and a project has private participation if a 
private sponsor has equity participation of at least 15 percent in the project.5 All private sponsors 
of projects in the database in the case of the African continent come from major companies that 
are multinational in scope.6 Private sponsors either invest in the form of physical assets or in 
payments to the government.   
As stated above, not all projects are entirely privately owned, operated, or financed, and 
many also have public participation. The four different types of PPI projects captured in the 
database are management and lease contracts, concessions (or management and operation 
contracts with major private capital commitments), greenfield projects, and divestitures.7  
Extending beyond private investments alone, PPI better captures the interaction between 
multinational corporations and host governments, and therefore is more applicable to the 
endeavor of analyzing the role multinational corporations play in state consolidation. The 
database includes only projects that have reached financial closure, and for most projects the 
investment is recorded in the year of financial closure.8  
Finally, I chose PPI as a measure of MNC investment in Africa because of its focus on 
investment in the infrastructure sector. Most infrastructure projects by their nature are tied to 
territory, meaning that increased private participation in infrastructure is linked to the need for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The data are all logged to smooth the distribution. The log is calculated by taking the ln(PPI+1).  
5 State-owned enterprises or their subsidiaries are also considered private investors only in projects located in 
foreign countries. In these cases they are coded as multinational corporations. 
6 These companies are not, however, all headquartered outside of the African continent. The goal is to capture MNC 
involvement in Africa and its relation to terrorism levels. While this is relevant to the broader concept of 
globalization, I do not attempt to draw conclusions specifically about foreign influence in Africa, but rather about 
MNC private investment influence.  
7 Please see the database in “References” for an extended explanation. 
8 Exceptions are made for investments recorded during the year the transaction took place if there are phased 
divestiture projects or projects in which service quality and coverage define investment commitments. 
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control over land on which projects are built. Thus, PPI incorporates elements of territorial 
contestation, which are linked to increased levels of indiscriminate violence as outlined in the 
“Theory” section. The infrastructure sectors included in the PPI database are energy, 
telecommunications, transport, and water.9  
Dependent Variables 
There are two dependent variables, one for each hypothesis. The “Number of Terrorist 
Attacks” is the dependent variable for Hypothesis 1, measured as a count in an African country 
each year. As previously stated, the logic behind Hypothesis 1 is that increased PPI will increase 
state penetration into previously ungoverned territories, leading to issues of territorial 
contestation, and consequently to higher levels of terrorism. Data are collected from the RAND 
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (Jones and Libicki 2008). The data on the number of 
attacks committed by each terrorist group have been aggregated to display total number of 
attacks per country year. The database shows the number and location of terrorist attacks 
committed by each terrorist group for each year the group remained active. It draws on a 
compilation of publicly available data from open source material, such as media reports. The 
database defines terrorism as “violence calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm to 
coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they 
desired to take. Acts of terrorism are generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of 
all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve 
maximum publicity.” (RDWTI as cited in Jones and Libicki 2008). Lastly, RAND includes both 
domestic and transnational attacks in its database, which is in line with the aims of my research. I 
use both transnational and domestic attacks because the theory indicates that both foreign 
workers and domestic nationals may be targeted in an effort to oust MNC investment. At the 
state level, terrorism could be the result of selective attacks against workers in contested areas or 
indiscriminate attacks, such as bombings in the capital. I make no distinction between the effect 
of PPI Investment on transnational and domestic attacks, though it can be argued that 
transnational attacks are more significant in affecting the decisions of MNCs. I leave these topics 
open for future research.  
In Hypothesis 2, I conduct a duration analysis and the dependent variable is the hazard 
rate of a government victory over a terrorism campaign, or the chance of “Government Success.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See the database in “References” for a more in-depth discussion of the types of projects included in each sector. 
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Data are taken from the RAND Corporation study titled “How Terrorists Groups End: Lessons 
for Countering al Qa’ida” (cited in Jones and Libicki 2008), providing 26 terrorism campaigns. 
Data are also taken from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism Group profiles, identifying an additional 99 terrorism campaigns on the African 
continent between 1990 and 2006.10 The data show the number of years a terrorist group 
remained operational, the reason that the group ceased operation, and the year in which it ceased 
operation.  
An instance of “Government Success” is coded as 1 for the year a terrorist group ends 
operations. This is measured by the hazard rate until the terrorist group collapses, is forcefully 
suppressed by the state, or disbands due to a negotiation with the state.11 An increase in the 
hazard rate corresponds to an increase in the chance of government victory, indicating 
acceleration in the termination of a terrorism campaign. Using hazard rate allows me to test 
whether MNC investment can bolster the state and decrease terrorist group survival over time.  
The data show 88 cases in which the government is victorious, which in turn accounts for 
about 73% of the terrorism campaigns. On average, the survival time of a terrorist group is 4.68 
years, with a standard deviation of 3.74, and a 17-year maximum survival time (roughly the 
entire period studied). Please see Figure 2 for a graph of the duration of terrorist campaigns in 
Africa 1990-2006.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Available at http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/ 
11 Government Success is coded as 0 if the terrorist group achieves a victory over the government. 
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Figure 2. The Duration of Terrorist Campaigns in Africa 1990-2006 
Control Variables 
For Hypothesis 1, I draw on the following works for my control variables: Li and Schaub 
(2004), Li (2005), Piazza (2008), Young and Findley (2011), and Aksoy and Carter (2014). 
Based on these studies, the continuous control variables I identify are: GDP per capita and 
country size (land). The dichotomous control variables I identify are: oil production, democracy 
(political participation [from Polity]), geographic location (North Africa or Sub-Saharan), and 
presence of civil war. Below I explain the decision to control for these variables.  
To better isolate the effect of PPI on terrorism levels, I control for GDP per capita 
because the literature shows possible links between the developmental level of a country and 
terrorism levels. Drawing from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Hegre and Sambanis (2006), I use 
the logs of the GDP per capita in 2014 USD. These data are also lagged by one year. I obtain 
these measures from the World Bank’s “Africa Development Indicators 2013” data set. Lastly, I 
also control for the logged land size of each state in squared kilometers (Marshall et al. 2012).   
 In terms of dichotomous variables, I control for whether each state is an oil producer. I 
define oil producers as states with crude oil reserves greater than one standard deviation from the 
mean level of oil reserves. For the time period under study, the mean level of proven oil reserves 
in African countries is 1.439 million barrels and the standard deviation is 5.22 million barrels. 
	  	   19	  
Thus, an oil producer is a state with over 6.66 million barrels of proven oil reserves.  I use data 
from British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy.12 Additionally, I control for whether 
a state is a democracy. Deferring to the Polity IV data set (Marshall et al. 2012), states with a 
polity score greater than 6 are coded as democracies (coded with a 1), while all other states are 
considered non-democratic (coded with a 0). This attempts to control for the possibility that the 
extent to which a regime is democratic affects terrorism count due to media coverage level etc. 
(Li 2005). Also, I use a dichotomous variable to control for a state being in North Africa.13 
Lastly, I control for whether a civil war is going on through the use of a dummy variable. 
Drawing from the UCDP/PRIO dataset, I code a country with a 1 if there is an ongoing civil war 
and 0 if there is not (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Descriptives for Hypothesis 1 can be found in Tables 
1a and 1b below. While the key explanatory variable is logged PPI Investment, I include the PPI 
Investment in USD Millions for reference.  
 
Table 1a. Hypothesis 1 Descriptive Statistics (Continuous Variables)  
 
Variable Observation Mean Sd Min Max 
LN PPI 
Investment  









881   
 




866  7.35 .99  4.62  10.12  
Land Area 
(sq. km)  
923  16.73  2.09  10.74  19.29  
Table 1b. Hypothesis 1 Descriptive Statistics (Dichotomous Variables)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Available at: http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world- 
energy-2013.html 
13 The variable “North” also controls for areas where al Qaeda affiliates later emerged. Although the dataset only 
encompasses 1990-2006, and al Qaeda linked groups tended to emerge toward the end of this period, I include this 
control to ensure that the results are not purely driven by states in the north that would soon experience al Qaeda 
violence 
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Variable Obs. 0 1 
Oil Producer 923  809 (87.7%)  114 (12.3%)  
Democracy 923  741 (80.3%)  182 (19.7%)  
North (Arab Africa) 923  762 (82.6%)  161 (17.4%)  
Civil War 923  859 (93.1%)  64 (6.9%)  
 
For Hypothesis 2 and the duration/survival of terrorist campaigns, I control for fewer 
variables due to the smaller data set. Again, I control for land area and civil war for similar 
reasons to those outlined for Hypothesis 1 above. However, I also control for military personnel 
(a measure of military capacity) instead of GDP per capita. While military capacity is a function 
of GDP, it is a more nuanced variable that illustrates the ability of a government to end a 
terrorism campaign, which therefore may affect the duration of these campaigns. I include this 
military personnel variable by logging the indicator for the size of each military from the 
Correlates of War database (Singer et al., 1972). Finally, I also control for infant mortality, 
which acts as one of the best predictors of state failure and could also affect the duration of 
terrorism campaigns (Rotberg 2003). Descriptives for Hypothesis 2 can be found in Tables 2a 
and 2b below. Again, I include the variables of PPI Investment and Cumulative PPI Investment 
in USD Millions for reference, though the logged versions of these variables are the main 
indicators in the analysis.  
 
Table 2a. Hypothesis 2 Descriptive Statistics (Continuous Variables) 










425 3.65 3.66 0 10.09 
PPI 
Investment 
425 427.81 997.85 0 5521 




















1977.16     4123.69           0 24126 
Land Area 
(sq. km)  
 








425 74.50 32.00 18.30 164.50 
 
Table 2b. Hypothesis 2 Descriptive Statistics (Dichotomous Variables)  
Variable Obs. 0 1 
Civil War 425 356 (83.76%)  69 (16.24%)  
 
Statistical Method 
 I conduct multivariate statistical analyses to test my hypotheses. For the first hypothesis, I 
want to capture terrorism as a count of incidents, while capturing the phenomenon of contagion 
that is often associated with terrorism (Cliff and First 2013), so I use a negative binomial 
regression to model the count of terrorist attacks per African country year in relation to the USD 
amount of PPI Investment (Table 3).  
 For the second hypothesis, the dependent variable is the survival of a terrorist group (or 
the hazard rate of the government prevailing over the group). The higher the hazard rate, the 
greater the chance that the government will prevail and the lower the chance of group survival. I 
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use the Cox Model to test the rate of group disintegration. This is known as a non-parametric 
survival model with a probability distribution and is often used to flexibly model the failure rate 
of a product over time or the survivability of a sick patient over time. In this case, I model 
terrorist group survivability over time and expect to find the coefficient for PPI Investment to be 
significant and negative at the .05 level and the coefficient for the Cumulative PPI Investment to 
be significant and positive at the .05 level. In accordance with Hypothesis 2, I expect that PPI 
investment in its outset will increase the chance of prolonging terrorism campaign duration, but 
over time the cumulative effect of PPI investment will enhance the chance of the state prevailing 
over terrorist groups. For robustness, I also test the explanatory variables with Probit and Logit 
models including a cubic polynomial to control for temporal dependence (see Table 4 below). I 
use robust standard errors clustered by country to estimate the models.  
Results 
Hypothesis 1 
Table 3. The Effect of PPI Investment (USD Millions) on Terrorist Attacks  
Variable RAND  
 
β  (s.e.)  
PPI Investment (USD Millions) 
(Log) 
.464 (.16)** 
Oil Producer .409 (.21) 
LN Per Capita GDP -.298 (.37) 
Democracy -.062 (.07) 
Land Area (Sq. KM) .214 (.15) 
North (Arab Africa) .264 (.82) 
Civil War 1.648 (.69)* 
Constant -4.301 (3.72) 
α  4.875 (1.36) 
N  314 
Log Likelihood  -297.44 
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Pr. > chi2  .00 
*p<.05; **p<.01  
 Table 4 displays the results of the test for Hypothesis 1. By examining the table we see 
that PPI Investment (USD Millions) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient when 
tested on the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents. If I look at the Incidence Rate 
Ratio, I can examine the substantive effect of increasing PPI Investment. Using the RAND 
indicator, a one unit increase in logged PPI Investment associates with a 137% increase in the 
chance of a terrorist event. Increasing PPI Investment therefore substantially increases the 
likelihood of an additional terrorist event in the African states.  
 
 
Figure 3. The Effect of PPI Investment (USD Millions) on Terrorist Attacks 
 
Moreover, looking at Figure 3 I can visually see the effect of PPI Investment (logged) on 
the number of terrorist attacks. While the graph indicates that on average there seems to be a 
base level of terrorism in the aggregate of African states, the shape of the graph indicates that 
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increasing Logged PPI Investment past the mean of 3.8 has an exponential effect on the number 
of predicted terrorist attacks. The mean is associated with .4 predicted attacks, one standard 
deviation away from the mean corresponds to 1.4 predicted attacks, and 2 standard deviations 
from the mean correspond with roughly 5 predicted attacks. Increasing PPI Investment by 1 
standard deviation above the mean leads to an approximate 350% increase in the probability of 
an attack, while increasing PPI Investment by 2 standard deviations enlarges this percent 
increase by a factor of 4.  
 These findings are in accordance with Hypothesis 1 and the theory. The additional state 
power and penetration into previously ungoverned territories, which is associated with the PPI 
Investment, appears to instigate a rise in terrorist attacks.  
Hypothesis 2 


















.12 (.05)* .10 (.04)* .18 (.07)* 
Land Area (Sq. 
KM) 
.31 (.09)** .15 (.06)* .33 (.13)* 
Military 
Capacity 
-.45 (.18)* -.29 (.15)* -.53 (.29) 
Civil War -.48 (.23)* -.33 (.19) -.64 (.33) 
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Infant Mortality .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.01) 
Constant  -.75 (1.14) -2.03 (2.19) 
N 396 396 396 
Log Likelihood -309.64 -146.27 -144.56 
Pr. > chi2 .00 .00 .00 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
 Let us now look at Table 4, which shows the results from my test of Hypothesis 2. The 
PPI Investment variable and the Cumulative PPI Investment variable are both statistically 
significant across the Cox, Probit, and Logit models. Moreover, we can see that the PPI 
Investment variable is negative, while the Cumulative PPI Investment variable is positive. This 
supports the argument of Hypothesis 2, which states that on the surface an increase in PPI 
Investment decreases the ability of the government to defeat or negotiate with a terrorist group, 
but the cumulative impact of PPI Investment will overall increase the probability that a terrorist 
campaign terminates in the face of the state government.  
 Look to the Cox distributions in Figures 4a and 4b (below) for an illustration of these 
phenomena. First of all, I want to call attention to the shape of the two graphs. In the terrorism 
campaigns studied, over time the hazard rate of government success decreases, hits a low point, 
and then increases again. This indicates that terrorism campaigns tend to lose steam if too much 
time has passed and they are still conducting attacks, rather than having transitioned to simply 
governing a territory without violence etc.  
 Secondly, let us compare the curves within the two graphs. Comparing Figures 4a and 4b, 
we see that the hazard rates of government success for cumulative investment are generally 
higher than the hazard rates from pure PPI investment, indicating that in general cumulative PPI 
has a greater positive impact on the likelihood of terrorist group disintegration. Furthermore, in 
3a we see the effect of increasing PPI Investment from the mean (PPI Investment = 2.4) by one 
standard deviation (PPI Investment = 5.4). This surface-level increase in the dollar amount 
invested decreases the chance of government success over a terrorist group by about 133%. In 
other words, at one standard deviation away from the PPI investment mean, a terrorist group’s 
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survival is roughly 1.33 times more likely. Thus, an initial increase in PPI Investment increases 
the chance of terrorist campaign survival as stated in part 1 of Hypothesis 2. However, in Figure 
4b we see the effect of increasing Cumulative PPI Investment from the mean (Cumulative PPI 
Investment = 3.6) to one standard deviation above the mean (Cumulative PPI Investment = 7.3). 
In this case, we see that overall the hazard of terrorist group termination increases by about 
150% as Cumulative PPI Investment increases on the African continent. In other words, in 
Figure 3b we see that as cumulative investment (logged) increases by one standard deviation 
above the mean the government is 1.5 times more likely to prevail over a terrorist group. This is 
evidence in support of the prediction made in the second part of Hypothesis 2.  
 
 
Figure 4a: The Effect of Increasing PPI Investment on the Hazard of Government Success 
in Terrorism Campaigns 
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Figure 4b: The Effect of Increasing Cumulative PPI Investment on the Hazard of 
Government Success in Terrorism Campaigns 
 
 Taken together with the theory, we see that PPI Investment initially seems to decrease the 
probability of government success. However, Cumulative PPI Investment creates and captures a 
far-reaching effect on the relationship between governments and terrorist groups, which 
eventually increases the probability of government success.  
CASE STUDY: MEND AND ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE NIGER DELTA  
PPI and Terrorist Attacks 
To illustrate the theory, causal mechanisms, and results highlighted by the statistical 
analysis, I would like to examine the case of energy infrastructure investment and the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). MEND is considered a terrorist organization, 
whose violence campaign lasted from 2006-2009. MEND mobilized largely in reaction to 
growing MNC energy infrastructure investment in the Niger Delta and the public-private 
partnerships that followed.   
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Nigeria is ranked as the largest oil producer in Africa and the world’s eighth largest oil 
exporter (EIA 2014). Nigeria’s economy is also largely oil dependent and 40% of Nigeria’s 
GDP, 90% of foreign exchange earnings, and 80% of government revenues can be attributed to 
the oil industry (Omeje 2006, 44). Most significantly, Nigeria’s energy industry is primarily 
located in the Niger Delta (EIA 2014). MNCs operate in joint ventures with the state-owned 
Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNPC) (EIA 2014) to control most of the oil and energy 
infrastructure in the region. There are over a dozen domestic crude oil pipelines that funnel oil to 
export terminals and domestic refineries, most of which are jointly owned by major MNCs and 
the Nigerian government (EIA 2014). The leading MNC in the Delta is Royal Dutch Shell, and 
other major players include ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total, Eni, Addax Petroleum, 
ConocoPhillips, Petrobras, and StatoilHydro (EIA 2014).  
Nevertheless, the Niger Delta is also home to over 20 ethnic groups that comprise over 
1,600 autonomous communities (Omeje 2006, 45). Historically, rebel militias dominated the 
Niger Delta and the government had minimal state penetration into the territory (Suarez 2005). 
During the Cold War, oil companies even used rebel militias for security and protection over 
their investment projects. Specifically among the Ijaw and Ogoni populations in the region, this 
led to heightened autonomy for militant groups. However, with the end of the Cold War and the 
adoption of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, the Nigerian central government and the U.S. 
increased cooperation, leading to an overall strengthening of the Nigerian government and a vote 
of confidence for the private sector looking to invest in the country. With state strength on the 
rise, MNCs transitioned towards dealing with the central government (instead of militant groups) 
for security on infrastructure investments. Nevertheless, with the central government and MNCs 
largely focused on profit maximization, income inequality and environmental degradation 
increased in the region over time.  
Many Delta populations began to feel that indigenous control of the territory’s energy 
and oil infrastructure would yield poverty relief (Omeje 2006, 45). Militant groups in the Niger 
Delta began to issue low level attacks against the territory’s public-private oil facilities (EIA 
2014), with the main grievance being the control of the energy infrastructure and ultimate control 
of exports and oil revenues (EIA 2014). In light of the rising political unrest, the state responded 
by pushing even further into the territory. To mitigate social grievances in the Delta, the 
government founded the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), which coincided with 
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a surge in public-private partnerships between MNCs and the Nigerian National Oil Corporation 
(NNOC). The previously militant-controlled territory was seeing a decrease in local autonomy, 
with the government and MNCs enjoying a lion-share of the profits. Most of the MNCs were 
from the U.S., China, and Europe, making the support for the Nigerian government’s resource 
control in the Delta seem unstoppable.  
In early 2006, however, a militant group called MEND started a campaign of terrorism 
against MNCs in the region, with the aim of obtaining greater control of the territory’s oil and 
energy infrastructure (Omeje 2006, 44). A major impetus for MEND’s emergence and shift 
towards violence was likely the 2005 sale of public lands to MNCs. 2005 marked the peak of 
public-private energy infrastructure expansion and oil production in the Niger Delta. Exploration 
peaked at the drilling of over 20 exploratory wells, and production peaked at 2.63 million barrels 
per day (EIA 2014, 3-4). In August 2005 the largest recorded number of private oil and gas 
industry players gathered to bid in the first parceling of Nigerian territory for investment since 
2000 (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 2010). The bid round offered over 70 blocks of 
land in the Niger Delta (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 2010), which threatened 
MEND’s monopoly on power and resources. Thus, MEND’s stated aim was to “destroy the 
capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil” (Howden, 2006). Its attacks intended to sever 
the agreements between MNCs and the NNOC, ultimately ousting PPI investment from the 
region and ending central government penetration. In a statement to MNCs in the region, MEND 
asserted, “It must be clear that the Nigerian government cannot protect your workers or assets. 
Leave our land while you can or die in it” (Howden 2006). This reaction of terrorism escalation 
in the face of MNC investment explains how PPI can yield militant violence against state 
penetration in previously ungoverned territories. In other words, the MNC investment and state 
penetration leads to increased territorial and resource contestation, which can cause militant 
groups to escalate violence and invoke terrorism campaigns as a strategy to oust investment and 
regain territorial control (Hypothesis 1).  
PPI and Terrorist Group Survivability 
Furthermore, the MEND case is interesting from the perspective of terrorism campaign 
duration analysis. As PPI investment initially increased in the Delta, the lifespan of MEND’s 
terrorism campaign seemed strong. With a clear list of grievances against specific PPI 
investment projects, MEND initially focused on violence against targets associated with the oil 
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industry. One of its first attacks came in January 2006 when militants stormed a Shell Oil facility 
and killed 17 people (Howden 2006). Other attacks in response to this initial increased PPI 
investment came in the form of car bombings, pipeline vandalism, and killing of foreign oil 
workers (Howden 2006). The campaign appeared both sustainable and successful (“Shell, Others 
Flee Offshore Amid Onshore Woes” 2013). From the perspective of the Nigerian state, during 
the early stages of investment the government was still trying to ride the line between 
incentivizing MNC investment and mitigating escalating social grievances in the region. The 
spikes in terrorism between 2006 and 2009 hurt the Nigerian economy, the Niger Delta MNCs, 
and the countries that import Nigerian oil. Shell evacuated nearly 100 employees in 2008 and 
Nigerian oil revenues fell by a third during this time period (“Oil Workers Flee Attacks by 
Militants in Nigeria” 2008). As PPI investment increased each year, the probability of 
government success over the MEND campaign seemed to decrease. 
However, overall PPI Investment did not fall in the Niger Delta between 2006 and 2009. 
MNCs were not easily intimated into departure and instead opted for alternative methods of 
energy development and oil revenue. For example, the MNCs brokered temporary deals with 
smaller oil companies on their riskier onshore blocks. They also temporarily moved oil 
infrastructure to deep-sea offshore fields, yet maintained access to key onshore pipelines and 
refineries in the Delta region (“Shell, Others Flee Offshore Amid Onshore Woes” 2013). Most 
MNCs decided that it was more cost-efficient to maintain control of energy infrastructure in the 
Niger Delta, and they worked to out-last MEND’s terrorism campaign.  
With sustained PPI investment over time, the resources pouring into the region 
accumulated. This caused the strength and penetration of the Nigerian government to accumulate 
in the Delta as well, in accordance with the sustained backing from the MNCs. Cumulative PPI 
Investment had a substantive impact in the Delta over time, manifesting in the increased power 
of the Nigerian government to end the MEND terrorism campaign. MEND felt this increased 
state power as displayed by a shift in targets near the end of their campaign. As PPI investment 
accumulated and Nigerian state capacity became more threatening and intrusive in the Delta, 
MEND began attacking the state’s center. In early 2009 it attacked Nigerian soldiers in the Delta 
region and in July 2009 it carried out its first attack on Lagos. During this time, MEND’s 
rhetoric also shifted from grievances against general MNC investment to a declaration of war 
against the Nigerian oil industry and the Nigerian armed forces at large. This redirection of 
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MEND efforts towards the state center is indicative of the strengthening of the Nigerian 
government with sustained and accumulating PPI investment. Thus, as PPI Investment 
accumulated between 2006 and 2009, the Nigerian government’s probability of successfully 
disbanding MEND increased as well.   
Though the Nigerian government launched a military campaign to crush MEND, in late 
2009 it granted MEND an amnesty deal that dissolved the organization (Rice 2009). 10,000 
MEND militants were offered an unconditional pardon and cash payments, as well as the freeing 
of leader Henry Okah. In exchange, MEND leaders agreed to lay down arms and basically 
disappear from the Delta (Rice 2009). MEND officials have vocally and adamantly asserted that 
the militant group is “dead” (Amaize 2013). In light of sustained MNC presence in the region, 
the impact of PPI investment accumulated throughout the terrorism campaign, which 
strengthened the state. With its increasing monopoly on resources, territory, and power in the 
Delta, the Nigerian government became increasingly capable of either forcefully or peacefully 
disbanding MEND (Hypothesis 2). Ultimately, MEND could not sustain its campaign in the face 
of the Nigerian government bolstered by MNC engagement. While initial increases in PPI 
investment seem to reduce the likelihood of state success over terrorism campaigns, as PPI 
investment accumulates over time the likelihood of government success over the survival of 
terrorist campaigns increases.  
CONCLUSION 
Excitement over the economic “rise of Africa” is occurring simultaneously with growing 
concern over Africa as the new frontier for terrorism. To reconcile these seemingly disparate 
arguments, I turned to an examination of the relationship between private participation in 
infrastructure (PPI) and terrorism on the African continent. I argued that through the lens of 
territorial contestation and state-consolidation, multinational corporation (MNC) investment has 
the potential to alter the dynamics between the state and terrorist groups. When MNC investment 
comes in, the state has more backing to consolidate its power and assert influence over regions 
previously controlled by militant groups. Moreover, the physical presence of initial investment 
provides an easy target for the grievances of militant groups who feel threatened by state 
penetration. This means a short-term increase in terrorism attacks, as territories become 
contested, and a short-term increase in campaign survivability, as terrorist groups feel 
emboldened to oust governments and MNCs at the early stages of investment. Ultimately, 
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however, cumulative and sustained PPI will lead to greater state strength and a greater 
probability of government victory over terrorism campaigns.  
Still, my research has some limitations that also raise interesting implications for future 
studies. The analysis is limited in that it focuses on statistical methodology, but is lacking in case 
studies. Further research should employ narratives and country examples to test the theoretical 
argument against additional specific incidents of investment and terrorism on the continent.. 
Moreover, for certain case studies, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) modeling would add 
to the analysis by creating a concrete and visual representation of PPI and state expansion in 
relation to sub-state territorial control and terrorism over time. Also, infrastructure is only one 
major sector of African economies, and further research should examine whether the theory 
presented here is applicable to other sectors of MNC African investment, such as agribusiness 
and healthcare.  
Finally, my analysis also raises some interesting considerations for U.S. counterterrorism 
policy and private investment initiatives on the African continent. I expect the private sector to 
be a key ally in fostering African growth, while also bolstering the chance for sustained state 
stability and development on the African continent. For investing companies, this means that a 
better business climate in Africa in the long-term can be fostered by more investment now. 
Consequently, counterterrorism initiatives should examine the potential for this private sector 
engagement, and the role that commercial diplomacy can play in building strong African states 
more generally. However, more policy work is needed to understand the best strategies for 
working with the private sector and enhancing these public-private synergistic relationships. 
While the results may suggest that MNC investment ultimately enhances state capacity against 
terrorist groups, such influence can have dangerous consequences in the opposite direction 
should the flow of investment suddenly cease. This point is especially important given that 
sustained investment seems to be the key to decreasing the duration of terrorism campaigns. 
While only time will tell whether the threat of investment flight will materialize, in the meantime 
there is a need for pragmatic, inter-sector dialogue on the overlap of economic and political risks 
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